Work in progress

Overreaction in Expectations with Endogenous Feedback (2025) - Job market paper (draft available soon)

Inattention to Financial Information: The Role of Income (2025) (draft available soon)

(with Manuel Mosquera Tarrio and Alena Wabitsch)

Funded by BA/Leverhulme Grant 2023 & Joachim Herz Award 2022 

Working papers

Forward Guidance and Credibility (2024)  pdf

Abstract

This paper measures variation in central bank credibility through the level of agreement in a monetary policy committee and empirically studies its relevance for the effectiveness of forward guidance. In the European Central Bank’s (ECB) institutional framework, high-frequency identification shows that non-unanimity within the Governing Council makes financial markets doubt the credibility of their commitment to forward guidance promises. Instead, they expect a change in policy direction, regardless of the ECB promising the opposite. Reduced credibility of the commitment then dampens the effect the easing bias in communication has on expectations while confirming unanimity does not seem to reinforce it.